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CHAPTER 1 
 
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
The 1996 Constitution
1
 has enhanced and entrenched local government as a sphere of 
government, alongside the national and provincial spheres, which are all distinctive but inter-
dependent and interrelated.
2
  With the new recognition, local governments are now vested 
with the mandate of development of the local communities by providing services that 
improve the social and economic conditions of the people. This mandate of local government 
is moulded in the concept of developmental local government. Developmental local 
government has been defined as local government committed to working with citizens and 
groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and 
material needs and improve the quality of their lives.
3
  This mandate finds its origin in the 
Constitution where local governments have been established with the objectives of providing 
democratic and accountable government to local communities and to ensure the provision of 
services to communities in a sustainable manner.
4
 These are, among others, the constitutional 
framework objectives within which local governments must and has been operating since the 
1996 Constitution. It sets the standard of measurement of the success of the new local 
government dispensation.  
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Fulfillment of the mandate vested in the local government entails a number of performance 
indicators. The better performance of municipalities requires sound governance and 
                                                          
1
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 108 of 1996. 
2
S 40 (1) Constitution 1996. 
3
 White Paper on Local Government section 1998 B 1. 
4
S 152 Constitution. 
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administration. The local government sphere has been facing problems in governance. The 
Local Government Turn Around Strategyacknowledges the issue of governance as one of the 
problems facing local governments. Governance includes areas of political leadership, 
institutional organisation, capacity and skills, oversight and regulation, monitoring and 
reporting.
5
 The State of Local Government in South Africa: Overview Report
6
 also indicates 
the issue of governance as one of the challenges facing local governments. The report‟s 
assessment shows that the governance problem is emanating from a number of factors 
including; (a) tension between the political and administrative interface, (b) poor ability of 
many councillors to deal with the demands of the local governments, (c) insufficient 
separation of powers between political parties and municipal councils, (e) lack of clear 
separation between executive and legislative functions, and (d) inadequate accountability 
measures.
7
 
The African National Congress (ANC), which is the ruling party,also acknowledged the 
prevalence of the above problems in the local government governance system.  The assertion 
is that the lack of separation of powers is affecting lines of accountability.
8
 The issues of 
separation of executive and legislative powers at local level and those of accountability, 
checks and balances, and oversight have been debated at various levels. The argument has 
been that the conflation of executive and legislative functions in the council as provided by 
section 151(2) of the Constitution leads to the lack of clarity on the roles of office bearers as 
well as lack of oversight.  Amendment of section 151(2) of the Constitution to create a 
                                                          
5
 Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs Local Government Turn Around Strategy 
2009 18. 
6
 Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs State of Local Government in South Africa: 
Overview Report 2009. 
7
 CoGTA State of Local Government in South Africa: Overview Report 2009 10. 
8
 African National Congress Legislative and Governance Sub-committee Provincial and local Government 
Review Discussion paper 2010 16. 
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separation of powers at local level is suggested as a solution.
9
 In the 2012 Legislative and 
Governance Policy document the ANC agreed to the constitutional separation of powers as a 
solution to the above problem.
10
 The other viewpoint, however, has been that the problems 
can be dealt with without any constitutional amendment.
11
 The proponents of the latter view 
recommend the use of mechanisms provided by legislation as a solution to the problems of 
lack of accountability and oversight, and the lack of checks and balances. Questions still 
remain as to what are these mechanisms and how can they be used for better oversight and 
delimitation of executive and legislative functions. The background, coupled with the latter 
suggestion and the question raised, require a systematic assessment of the practical context.  
1.3  RESEARCH QUESTION 
The governance problem in local governments is linked to poor accountability and oversight. 
The debate on the solution to this problem has concentrated on the constitutional conflation 
of power at local level. The proponents of the idea to amend section 151(2) of the 
Constitution to provide for separation of powers overlook the fact that legislation has 
provided mechanisms that allow internal separation of powers. On the other hand, the 
proponents of the idea to maintain the constitutional provision and use legislative 
mechanisms have not made a proper study of the practical use of those mechanisms. Some 
metropolitan municipalities have made use of the mechanism to create some form of 
separation of powers in their governance system. It is for this reason that this study aims to 
investigate and analyse how the selected metropolitan municipalities have utilised the 
legislative mechanisms to foster greater oversight and separation of powers within their 
structures. The study answers the following questions; what mechanisms have been 
                                                          
9
 De Visser and Akintan Institutional Tension Between Municipal Chairperson and Executives: Speaking of 
Mayor Conflict 2009 23. 
10
 African National Congress Legislative and Governance Policy Discussion Document 2012 18. 
11
 De Visser J ‘The Political Administrative Interface in South African Municipalities: Assessing the Quality of 
Local Democracies’ In Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 2010 101. 
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employed? How they have been used? What is the state of oversight structures and 
delimitation of powers? What are the best practices in the systems of governance? 
The study proceeds with the argument that a better and purposeful utilisation of the available 
mechanisms within the current constitutional setup of local government, can lead to practical 
separation of executive and legislative powers as well as better oversight.  
Amongst a wide range of mechanisms, the focus of this study is on terms of reference and 
delegation systems as required by section 53 and 59 of the Systems Act,
12
 respectively. In 
that regard the study will examine how the selected metropolitan municipalities have 
allocated powers through the terms of reference and systems of delegation to the offices of 
the speaker, the chief-whip, the executive mayor and the office of the municipal manager.  
The other mechanisms that this study will focus on are section 79 committees and the 
reporting system under the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA).
13
 In that regard 
the standard structures and powers of the committees will be examined.  With regard to the 
MFMA reporting system, the study will examine the practice in implementation of the mid-
year, annual reporting and oversight reporting. In examining these mechanisms, regard will 
be placed on their relation to oversight and separation of powers. 
1.4  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The study is important in that it fills the knowledge gap that has been left in the discussion of 
the constitutional conflation of executive and legislative powers, its consequences and how to 
deal with it without amending the Constitution. The study will draw lessons from the practice 
in the selected metropolitan municipalities on how best the legislative mechanisms can be 
utilised to separate executive and legislative powers and create greater oversight and 
accountability at local government level. These best practices can be replicated in other 
                                                          
12
 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, No 32 of 2000. 
13
 Ss 71, 72, 121 and 129 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act No 56 of 2003. 
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municipalities in an effort to improve oversight and accountability for better municipal 
governance. Apart from filling the information gap, the study will inform policy makers of 
the practical ways of managing the combined executive and legislative powers at local 
government level for better municipal governance and administration. The study is significant 
in that its outcome will provide direction on improving oversight and contribute to fostering 
good governance and better service delivery in the long run. 
1.5  METHODOLOGY 
The study was carried out using a desktop research methodology. Legislation, case law, 
research papers, journal articles, reports, circulars, and manuals were consulted especially in 
examining the mechanisms in 1.3 above. The written terms of reference and documents 
spelling out delegation systems as required by the Systems Act
14
 were used in examining how 
purposefully they have been employed for oversight and separation of powers. Mid-year 
reports, oversight reports, annual reports and related documents of the selected metropolitan 
municipalities as required by the Municipal Finance Management Act were a significant 
source of information on the reporting system in relation to oversight.  
The study was carried out in the selected metropolitan municipalities of Cape Town, 
Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni. These metropolitan municipalities have been selected based on 
the fact that they have put in place systems delimiting executive and legislative powers of the 
council. 
1.6    CHAPTER OUTLINE  
The paper proceeds, in the next chapter, by examining the concepts of separation of powers 
and oversight, their relationships and the legal framework in the South African constitutional 
system.  The chapter further considers the problems considered as resulting from the current 
                                                          
14
 Ss 53 and 59 MFMA. 
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constitutional set up in respect of executive and legislative powers at municipal level and 
discusses the different viewpoints. 
The third chapter considers in detail the legislative mechanisms and structures; i.e. terms of 
reference, delegation, section 79 committees and reporting mechanisms, as tools of oversight 
and separation of powers. Chapter four considers how the three metropolitan municipalities 
under review have made use of the above mentioned mechanisms and structures to ensure 
segregation or separation of powers and functions and to facilitate oversight. Chapter five 
presents findings, the best practices and makes recommendations in relation to separation of 
powers and enhancing oversight.  
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CHAPTER 2  
SEPARATION OF POWERS, OVERSIGHT AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The study concerns the legislative mechanisms that may be used to provide a separation of 
powers and enhance oversight in local government. It is undertaken in the context of South 
African law and practice in metropolitan municipalities and necessitated by a number of 
governance problems that are attributed to the conflation of executive and legislative powers 
in the municipal council. In that regard, it is necessary that the study begin with an 
examination of the theoretical aspect of the concepts of oversight and separation of powers. 
Further, this chapter analyses the relationship between oversight and separation of powers 
and the relationship between oversight and accountability. This is followed by a discussion of 
the constitutional and legislative framework of separation of powers and oversight at local 
government level.  The challenges resulting from the functional arrangement in the local 
governance system cited by certain interest groups and scholars are briefly outlined. The 
chapter concludes with a brief statement on the divergent options on how to deal with the 
governance problems resulting from the conflation of powers at local level.  
2.2  THE CONCEPTS OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND OVERSIGHT  
2.2.1 Understanding separation of powers 
Separation of powers is a jurisprudential doctrine or principle that requires a division and 
delimitation of powers and functions of the branches of government classified as executive, 
legislative and judicial in a sense that each of the three branches of government is responsible 
for a single function. The doctrine was conceived on the need to protect the liberty of 
individuals and is an antithesis of tyrannical rule.  Separation of powers “prevents the 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judicial, in the same hands, whether of 
 8 
 
one, a few men or many, and whether hereditary or elected”.15 The application of the doctrine 
ensures independence of the branches of government, facilitates an expedient division of 
labour, creates more seats or avenues of power and develops areas of expertise in the 
respective branches.
16
 
The principle of separation of powers is not only important in that it creates efficiency, but it 
is also necessary in ensuring that there are proper checks and balances of the exercise of 
power as well as better oversight relationships.
17
 The principle of separation of powers 
divides powers of government among different branches of government, whereas the doctrine 
of checks and balances prevents each of the branches from usurping power of another 
branch.
18
 The existence of the system of checks and balances follows the existence of a 
separation or delimitation of powers and functions. Separation of powers, therefore, is a 
principle that serves a number of purposes. The main purpose that it serves is to prevent the 
accumulation of all powers; legislative, executive and judicial in one body or person so as to 
allow a proper and reciprocal check or control of the exercise of the powers of government.  
2.2.2 Understanding oversight 
In the ordinary English meaning, oversight in so far as it is relevant to the concept under 
discussion is derived from the word oversee. To oversee is to watch somebody or something 
and make sure that a job or activity is done correctly.
19
 In the context of this discussion, 
oversight is considered in the scenario of a relationship between the legislative organs to 
oversee the executive and administrative organs, commonly referred to as legislative 
                                                          
15
 O’Regan K ‘Checks and Balances Reflections on the Development of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers in 
the South African Constitution’ in PER Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 18(1) 2005 4, quoting Thomas 
Madison in the Federalist Papers.  
16
 De Visser and Akintan Institutional TensionBetween Municipal Chairpersons and Executives-Speaking of 
Mayor Conflicts 2008 11. 
17
 De Visser and Akintan 2008 11, and O’Regan K 2005 4. 
18
Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), 1996 (4) 
SA 744(CC) at Para 108. 
19
Hornby AS Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English 2010. 
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oversight.  Legislative oversight connotes the legislative supervision or watchfulness of the 
authority which is considered delegated to the executive branch and entities.
20
 According to 
Lemos, it connotes the notion of monitoring, supervising and controlling.
21
 In another use of 
phraseology, the Ohio Legislative Commission defines legislative oversight as legislative 
review and evaluation of activities of the executive branch of government.
22
 In essence 
oversight refers to the watchfulness, supervision, control, monitoring, review and evaluation 
of the exercise of power of the executive and executive organs by the legislature. In this 
study, oversight refers to such legislative oversight in municipal governance.  
A useful distinction of the types of oversight can be made, depending on the stage of the 
decision making process. These types are classified as ex ante oversight, concurrent oversight 
and ex post oversight.
23
Exante oversight entails providing consent to the proposals of the 
executive by way of approving or delegating accordingly. This is a way of scrutiny of the 
subject before a decision is taken by the overseen body or person.
24
  Concurrent oversight is 
the legislative oversight that focuses on the behaviour of the executive during the execution 
stage of the policies, laws, programmes or any other delegation. 
25
Ex post oversight is 
oversight that occurs at the end of the implementation phase and examines performance 
against the goals of enacted policy or approved programmes.
26
 
Oversight is important as it ensures that the executive complies with legislative intent, 
improves efficiency and effectiveness, evaluates performance, prevents executive 
encroachment on powers, and ensures investigation of alleged instances of poor 
                                                          
20
 Oleszek WJ Congressional Oversight: An overview Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 2010 
4. 
21
Lemos LB Legislative Oversight of the Executive Branch in Six Democracies in Latin America2010 7. 
22
 Ohio Legislative Service Commission A guide Book for Ohio Legislators 2010 73.  
23
Khaile ST Legal and Institutional Measures: Key Requirements for Effective municipal Budget Oversight (LLM 
Thesis, University of the Western Cape) 2011 14. 
24
 Khaile ST Thesis 14. 
25
 Khaile ST Thesis 15. 
26
 Khaile ST Thesis 16. 
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administration, abuse, waste, dishonesty and fraud.
27
 Oversight ensures that the executive 
arm of government is accountable for the exercise of their powers and performance of their 
functions.  
2.2.3 Relationship between separation of powers and oversight 
There is a relationship between separation of powers and oversight. This relationship exists in 
the sense that oversight, as defined above, requires an existing division or delimitation of 
powers classified as executive and legislative. That division or delimitation of powers is 
characteristically the prescription of the doctrine of separation of powers. It can, therefore, be 
rightly said that for legislative oversight to be effectively exercised, there must be some 
application of the doctrine of separation of powers. 
Separation of powers is also related to oversight if observed from the perspective of 
accountability. Adhering to the principle of separation of powers has the potential of 
enhancing accountability. According to Justice O‟Regan, separation of powers enhances the 
vision of democracy which is founded on the values of accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.
28
 Accountability is understood as a social relationship in which an actor feels an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other.
29
 The 
significant other to whom the account or explanation is given exercises watchfulness and 
oversees the accountor, thereby creating an oversight relationship. According to Bentham, the 
more strictly we are watched, the better we behave.
30
 This is the rationale behind emphasis on 
oversight and accountability. There is a relationship between accountability and oversight; 
the more an institution is overseen, the more accountable it becomes. The application of the 
                                                          
27
 Kaiser, Oleszeck and Talelman Congressional Oversight Manual 2010 2-3. 
28
 O’Regan K 2005 5. 
29
 Bovens M ‘Public Accountability’ inThe Oxford Handbook of public Accountability 2005 184. 
30
 Lindberg SI ‘Accountability: The Core Concept and its Sub-types’ in Africa Power and Politics Working Paper 
No 1 1999 7. 
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doctrine of separation of powers, therefore, ensures an environment that facilitates oversight 
and accountability 
2.3  CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
2.3.1 Separation of powers in the Constitution and legislation 
The Constitution has not expressly used the term separation of powers, but has made 
provisions which put into effect principles of the doctrine. The Constitutional Court, while 
determining whether the 1996 Constitution complied with the constitutional principles in 
providing for separation of powers, held that separation of powers was adequately provided.
31
 
The legislative, executive and judicial functions have been vested in different branches or 
organs, at least at national and provincial level. At national level legislative authority is 
vested in Parliament,
32
 executive authority is vested in the President who is supported by the 
cabinet,
33
 and as to judicial authority, it is vested in the  judiciary that adjudicate in the whole 
of South Africa without regard to spheres of government.
34
 At provincial level legislative 
power is vested in the provincial legislature
35
 and executive authority vested in the premier 
who is supported by the provincial executive council.
36
 There is, in this case, a clear division 
of powers between the three branches of government at the national and provincial level.  
At local government level, however, the Constitution has vested both legislative and 
executive powers in the council.
37
There is no separation of powers at municipal level, a 
position confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Masondo case,
38
 as will be noted below.  
Legislation, in line with the constitutional provision, has also provided that executive and 
                                                          
31
Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 111. 
32
 S 43(a) Constitution. 
33
 S 83 Constitution. 
34
 S 165(1) and s 166 Constitution do not subject the courts hierarchy to specific sphere of government as is 
the case with the legislature and executive. 
35
 S 43(b) Constitution. 
36
 S 125(1) Constitution. 
37
 S 151(2) Constitution. 
38
Democratic Alliance v Masondo 2003 (2) BCLR 128 (CC) Para 60. 
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legislative authority of a municipality rest in the council of the municipality, subject to 
delegation.
39
 
Despite generally vesting both legislative and executive authority in the council, legislation 
has to an extent the executive functions from the legislative functions. The allocation of 
functions of office bearers is done in a way that the executive office bearers perform and are 
responsible for specific executive functions. For instance, while providing that both executive 
and legislative authority are vested in the council, legislation has equally provided that the 
executive authority of the council may be exercised through the executive committee or the 
executive mayor, depending on whether ithas a collective executive  system or executive 
mayoral system.
40
 In such a scenario, legislative functions are performed by the council 
whereas executive functions are performed by the executive committee or executive mayor.
41
 
Besides the segregation of executive and legislative functions and structures, legislation has 
also provided mechanisms which if properly used, contribute to the separation of powers at 
local government level. These include the terms of reference which designate the roles and 
responsibilities of each political structure or office bearer and the systems of delegation 
through which the council may transfer part of its powers to political structures and 
positions.
42
 The use of such mechanisms to create some form of separation of powers and 
enhance oversight is the main subject of this study and will be discussed in the chapters to 
follow. At this stage what is clear is that the Constitution and legislation, while providing for 
oversight and separation of powers at national and provincial level, have not done so with 
regard to local government. 
                                                          
39
 S 11(1) Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, No 32 of 2000 (Systems Act). 
40
 S 7(a) and (b) Structures Act. 
41
Such segregation, however, does not exist in a plenary type of municipalities as executive authority is 
exercised by the council itself. 
42
 S 59(1) Systems Act. 
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2.3.2 Justification for conflation of powers at municipal level 
The absence of separation of powers in the legal framework may be justified. Justice 
O‟Regan in her dissenting judgment in the case of DA v Masondo stated that the absence of 
separation of powers at municipal level corresponds with the nature of the functions of local 
government. She stated that the functions of local government do not involve high affairs of 
the state such as defence, foreign affairs, justice and security, but merely matters dealing with 
delivery of services and facilities to local communities such as power, water, waste 
management, parks and recreation, and decisions on development and planning.
43
 This 
justification can be criticised on two grounds. First, the municipalities have enormous 
authority and do handle complex issues, especially with the growth of metropolitan 
municipalities.
44
 They are also involved in some matters of security in the local government 
areas as well as foreign municipal relations. Secondly, the original purpose for which the 
doctrine of separation of powers was meant to serve, i.e., to prevent tyranny and abuse of 
power, should not be the sole consideration. In modern times, separation of powers has been 
a mechanism for enhancing government efficiency. In the words of Justice O‟Regan herself, 
in some systems such as the South African one, it enhances democracy based on the values of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness.
45
 These factors justify having a separation of 
powers at municipal level other than conflation of powers. 
The other consideration could have been the need to accommodate all types or systems of 
municipalities which are different in form and size. In a plenary municipal system, both 
executive and legislative authority of the council is exercise through the council itself.
46
 
                                                          
43
DA v Masondo Para 60. 
44
 De Visser and Akintan 2008 13. 
45
 O’Regan K‘Checks and Balances Reflections on the Development of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers in 
the South African Constitution’in PER Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 8(1) 2005 5. 
46
 S 7(c) Structures Act. 
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Prescribing a separation of powers in the Constitution for municipalities would eclipse this 
form of municipal system. 
2.3.3 Perceived problems resulting from the conflation of powers at municipal level 
What, then, are the consequences of this conflation of executive and legislative powers at 
local level? De Visser has stated three challenges emanating from this constitutional set up.
47
 
First, he observes that the conflation of powers at local government level complicates or 
creates confusion in relation to the office of the speaker of the council. Although the speaker 
would properly be considered to be the head of the legislative functionality of the council, the 
council also makes executive and administrative decisions presided by the speaker. In 
practice, he or she is not really divorced from the municipal executive and municipal decision 
making. The Speaker‟s office is reliant on the executive and administration for its budget 
which makes it difficult for the office to exercise its functions independently. Further, the 
conflation sets a scene with likelihood of tension between the office of the speaker and that of 
the mayor.
48
 This tense relationship does not provide an environment conducive for cordial 
and efficient administration.  
De Visser states that there is no clarity as to the office in charge of municipal 
administration.
49
  Is it the speaker or the mayor? Thirdly, it is stated that the conflation makes 
room for municipalities leaves a chance for adoption of committees. In aligning with the 
conflation of powers provided by the Constitution, legislation has not boldly stipulated which 
committees are for the executive or for the council. Legislation has merely provided different 
types of committees with discretion of the municipalities to designate the powers and 
functions.   He observes that most of the municipalities, as a result, have adopted section 80 
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committees which are merely portfolio committees assisting the executive mayor and have 
not made use of section 79 committees which could have been providing independent 
oversight on the executive and administration.  
The African National Congress (ANC), through its National Executive Sub-committee also 
noted that the absence of separation of powers at municipal level results in a blurred line of 
accountability of the mayors and mayoral committees to the municipal council,
50
 as the 
mayor and mayoral committee are part and parcel of the council. The accountability and 
oversight relationships at local government level are not clear and straight forward and create 
a challenge in governance. The National State of Local Government Report 2009, as noted 
earlier, indicates that municipal governance is in distress and cited the lack of separation of 
powers between the council and the executive as one of the causes.
51
 
From the discussion and views above, it is clear that the absence of separation of powers at 
local government level is being cited as one of the causes of governance problems existing in 
the sphere.  
2.3.4 Defining and delineating the powers and functions at municipal level 
Relevant to the issue of separation of powers at local government level is the question of 
what constitutes legislative powers and functions, on the one hand and executive and 
administrative functions, on the other hand. Neither the Constitution nor legislation has 
clearly explained what are executive powers and functions or what are legislative powers and 
functions.  
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The distinction of the executive and legislative powers or function was part of the 
Constitutional Court decision inFedsure.
52
Ten corporate ratepayers objected to a substantial 
increase in their property rates.  They challenged the lawfulness of certain resolutions 
adopted by the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council (TMC) in relation to 
their 1996/97 budgets which had given rise to this increase. In the course of making the 
decision, the court had to decide whether the resolution making process was an administrative 
action to be reviewed by the court under section 24 of the interim Constitution.
53
The court 
held that the resolution raising the levy, which was being challenged, formed an integral part 
of adopting a budget and constitutes exercise of taxing and spending powers. Such powers 
are classified as legislative as opposed to administrative and not reviewable under section 24 
of the interim Constitution.
54
 
The Court also distinguish legislative and administrative action based on the nature of the 
decision making body and the decision making process. It stated that legislation made by 
functionaries is made through a process which is substantially administrative, while the 
process of law making by deliberative bodies is essentially legislative.
55
 This, however, does 
not mean that all decisions of a deliberative body like a municipal council are legislative. In 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal,
56
 for instance, the power to appoint staff was 
held to be part of the executive authority of the council provided by the Constitution which 
cannot be divested either by delegation or legislation.
57
 This means that even though the 
power to appoint staff is administrative and is provided by section 55(1) of the Systems Act, 
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it is part of the powers of the council delegated to the administration and may still be 
exercised by the council itself. 
In the Mnquma case,
58
 the court attempted to explain what constitutes executive functions as 
it was considering the meaning of executive obligations in the context of section 139(1) of 
the Constitution. Executive functions were said to be the residue of functions of government 
after legislative and judicial functions have been taken away. The Court was of the view that 
the word executive in local government, as it relates to obligations, must be given the same 
ordinary meaning as at national and provincial level. These executive functions include the 
power and authority to implement and administer legislation in relation to local government 
powers; the provision of necessary services and administration; the development of policy in 
relation thereto, and the initiation, implementation and administration of by-laws within its 
functions.
59
 This is the ambit of executive powers and functions at local government level.  
2.3.5 Oversight in the Constitution and legislation 
At national level the National Assembly is responsible for, among other things, scrutinising 
and overseeing executive action.
60
 In another provision, the Constitution unequivocally 
obliges the National Assembly to provide mechanisms that will ensure that all executive 
organs at national level are accountable to it, and that it maintains oversight over the exercise 
of national executive authority.
61
 In the oversight and accountability relationship between 
Parliament and the executive, members of the Cabinet are required to provide to Parliament 
full and regular reports concerning matters under their control.
62
 Legislative oversight over 
executive organs at national level has, therefore, been clearly provided for in the Constitution.  
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At provincial level the provincial legislature is instructed to have mechanism to ensure that 
all executive organs in the province are accountable to it and that it must maintain oversight 
of the exercise of executive authority in the province.
63
  Further, members of the executive 
council are required to provide to the legislature full and regular reports concerning matters 
under their control.
64
 In this case as well, oversight has been clearly provided for by the 
Constitution.  
At local government level the Constitution does not expressly provide for legislative 
oversight over the executive. The absence of an express provision for legislative oversight 
flows from the fact that both the executive and legislative powers are vested in the 
council.
65
Legislation imports from the Constitution the vesting of both executive and 
legislative authority in the council.
66
The constitutional set up creates a drawback in terms of 
oversight because the council cannot oversee its own exercise of executive authority. It 
makes a difference if the executive functions are exercised by another structure over which 
the council will exercise oversight.  
In the case of executive mayor or executive committee municipal systems, however, the 
executive authority of the council may be exercised through the executive mayor or the 
executive committee.
67
 In such scenarios, there is a separate body or organ to exercise 
executive functions on behalf of the council. This then brings in the possibility of the council 
overseeing the exercise of such executive authority. Further to that, legislation has provided 
mechanisms that may be used to separate the executive from the council, i.e., terms of 
reference and delegations. The same mechanisms may be used to facilitate oversight at local 
government level by allocating proper oversight functions to legislative structures. 
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Additionally, some legislative mechanisms, such as annual and mid-year reporting, budget 
processes and performance assessments, ensure that the council exercises oversight over the 
executive mayor or executive committee.  
Thus, despite the absence of an express provision in the Constitution and legislation for 
legislative oversight in municipalities, there are provisions and mechanisms that facilitate the 
council oversight over the executive mayor or executive committee. 
2.4  THE DEBATE ON SEPERATION OF POWERS AND OVERSIGHT 
Generally, academics and policy makers do agree that the conflation of legislative and 
executive powers in the same council at local government level creates a challenge which has 
a negative impact on governance. There is, however, a difference of options on how to deal 
with the problems attributed to the conflation of powers at municipal level.  
De Visser and Akintan in discussing the tension that exist between the office of the speaker 
and that of the mayor intimated that the amendment of section 151(2) of the Constitution to 
provide for a separation of powers would be one of the options in dealing with the tension 
between the two offices.
68
  This, according to them, would entail a reworking of related 
legislation that deals with political structures at local level. They indicate, however, that this 
option would bring significant changes to the local government system. They argue that a 
prior nuanced study of what could entail in practice should be done as a viable test before 
adopting the option.
69
 This, nevertheless, has been a view of many other people and 
organisations in policy discussion forums, including the ANC. The ANC, however, has fallen 
short of recommending amendment of section 151(2) of the Constitution. It has merely 
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recommended that there should be a greater separation of executive and legislative arms of 
municipalities.
70
 It is not clear whether the ANC envisages a constitutional amendment 
De Visser on the other hand, while accepting that the conflation of powers creates a 
challenge, argues that the focus should not be on the debate on conflation of powers but on 
other ways of improving governance and resolving the resulting problems within the current 
legal framework.
71
 The municipalities, he states, can make use of legislative mechanisms 
which already provide for a degree of separation of the functions at local level.
72
 These 
mechanisms can be used to effectuate separation of powers at local government level without 
constitutional amendment 
The discourse above shows views on how to deal with the consequent problems of the 
conflation of powers at local level. Despite these diverse options, this study focuses on 
understanding how the latter option has been used by the selected metropolitan municipalities 
to provide for the separation of powers and enhance oversight. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has noted that oversight is an important function for effective governance. It is 
one of the attributes of good governance as it ensures the accountability of those who 
exercise power. It has also been noted that the doctrine of separation of powers, when applied 
in a governance system, creates an environment conducive to oversight and accountability as 
it delineates powers and functions of different structures of governance. There is an inherent 
relationship between separation of powers and oversight. 
In the South African context, it has been observed that while the Constitution has provided 
for legislative oversight at national and provincial level, it has not provided for legislative 
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oversight at local government level. This causes governance challenges in the local 
government sphere.   
It has been noted that there are two possible options in dealing with the problems of 
governance attributed to the conflation of powers. These are either to amend the Constitution 
and provide for separation of powers, or to retain the current legal set up and work with it. 
The latter option proposes the use of available legislative mechanisms to provide for 
separation of powers in practice. The mechanisms that may be used will be discussed in detail 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGISLATIVE MECHANISMS AND STRUCTURES FOR SEPARATION OF 
POWERS AND OVERSIGHT 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
It has been noted that one proposition emphasises on the use of mechanisms made available 
by legislation to provide for separation of powers and functions, and to facilitate meaningful 
oversight at municipal level.  The utilisation of these mechanisms and structures is the subject 
of this study. There are a number of such mechanisms provided by legislation. They include 
the terms of reference and the systems of delegation as required by the Systems Act,
73
 use of 
annual reports, use of service delivery and budget implementation plan (SDBIP), budget 
statement, mid-year budget performance reviews, performance agreements, use of section 79 
committees and oversight committees.  
This chapter examines a selection of these mechanisms, particularly those that are considered 
significant in creating separation of powers and better oversight relationships at municipal 
level. The scope of the chapter is limited to analysing the use of terms of reference and 
systems of delegation, section 79 committees, and the annual and mid-year budget 
assessment reporting. The analysis proceeds in that order below. 
3. 2  TERMS OF REFERENCE AND DELEGATION 
3.2.1 Terms of reference 
The Systems Act instructs municipalities to allocate roles and responsibilities to political 
structures, political office bearers and the municipal manager through the use of terms of 
reference.
74
 This is one of the means that municipalities may use to segregate powers, 
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functions and structures in their governance models and to enhance oversight through proper 
oversight relationships.  
A „political structure‟ in this case has been defined as including the council of the 
municipality, or any committee or other collective structure of a municipality elected, 
designed or appointed in terms of specific provisions of the Municipal Structures Act.
75
 A 
political office bearer has been defined as including the speaker, executive mayor, deputy 
executive mayor, mayor, deputy mayor or member of the executive committee as referred to 
in the Municipal Structures Act.
76
 
Through this process of designating roles and responsibilities, municipalities may allocate 
those roles and responsibilities in a manner that segregates executive powers, functions and 
structures from legislative powers, functions and structures. It is through this process that 
better oversight relationships and oversight roles can be created. 
The Systems Act requires that these respective roles and responsibilities be drawn in precise 
terms of reference and must be acknowledged and given effect to in the rules, procedures, 
instructions, policy statements and other written instruments of the municipality.
77
  In 
essence, municipalities have been given the power and discretion to design roles and 
responsibilities of political structures and political office bearers in addition to the powers 
and functions already allocated by the Constitution or legislation to these office bearers and 
structures. The discretion is significant as it gives the municipalities an opportunity to design 
the governance structures in a manner that facilitates oversight.  
The Systems Act has also provided which matters are to be taken into account when 
allocating the roles and responsibilities or designing the structures. First, it is required that the 
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allocation of roles and responsibilities must determine the relationship among the political 
structures, the political office bearers and the manner in which they are to interact.
78
 
Secondly, the allocation of roles and responsibilities must determine appropriate lines of 
accountability and reporting.
79
 Thirdly, the designation of roles and responsibilities must also 
determine mechanisms, processes and procedures for minimising cross-referrals and 
unnecessary overlapping of responsibilities between the structure and office bearers, 
including the mechanisms of resolving disputes and for interaction.
80
 By this mechanism, 
municipalities can allocate the roles and responsibilities in a manner that some office bearers 
and structure exercise oversight functions on other office bearers and structures. 
3.2.2 Systems of delegation 
The Constitution
81
 and legislation have given the council all the executive and legislative 
authority of a municipality, including the power to make all decisions, subject only to what 
has been delegated under section 59 of the Systems Act.
82
 The Systems Act prescribes that a 
municipal council must develop a system of delegation that will maximise administrative and 
operational efficiency and provide for adequate checks and balances.
83
 It is important to note 
that the delegation systems are aimed at maximising administrative and operational 
efficiency, and aimed at providing for checks and balances. As was noted in the previous 
chapter,
84
 the system of checks and balances presupposes a division or segregation of powers 
and functions and makes sure that the relevant structures or office bearers do not encroach on 
the authority or powers or functions of another or that they do not overstep their limits. From 
this provision, therefore, it may be concluded that the law envisages that there will be a 
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division of functions.  These systems of delegation may be used to give executive powers and 
functions to political structures and political office bearers other than the council. That is a 
useful mechanism that may be utilised jointly with the terms of reference. In the process, 
different political office bearers and structures separated or segregated from the council are 
allowed to exercise the executive powers and functions with some independence. 
In defining the concept of oversight, Oleszek defined it as a kind of legislative supervision or 
watchfulness of authority which is considered delegated to the executive branch entities or 
officials.
85
 In line with the definition, the use of these delegation systems will entail that some 
political structures and political office bearers will be designated as executive by means of 
delegation.In that manner, the council will be able to oversee them and hold them 
accountable for the exercise of their delegated powers as well as performance of their 
functions. This aligns with the general trend in representative parliamentary democracies. 
According to Stromp, representative parliamentary democracies feature a chain of 
delegations from voters to those who govern. One such step is the delegation from the 
legislature to the executive branches.
86
 With proper use of the mechanism of delegation, 
municipalities can accordingly separate council powers between executive and legislative, 
thereby creating some oversight and accountability relationships. The difference is that the 
Constitution has vested legislative powers to Parliament and provincial legislature, separating 
it from the executive functions, while at local government level there is no such specific 
legislative function vested in the council separated from the executive functions. This limits 
the nature of the separation that may be created by the delegation as the delegated powers and 
functions can still be exercised by the council. 
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The Systems Act ensures accountability by office bearers or structures thatexercisedelegated 
powers and functions by prescribing some measures. First, it requires that the recipients of 
delegated powers report to the delegating authority at intervals.
87
 Secondly, the delegation 
may be reviewed by the council whenever it is considered necessary.
88
 Thirdly, the 
delegation may be withdrawn.
89
 Lastly, matters within the scope of the delegated powers 
maybe referred back to the delegating authorityfor decision.
90
 This means that the council 
will still keep a watch over the exercise of powers which are delegated. The use of systems of 
delegation as provided by legislation is a viable tool for creating a model of separation of 
powers where better oversight relationships exist. The above factors, however, are drawbacks 
in relation to independent functioning and separation of the executive from the council. The 
provisions vest strong oversight powers in the council, but result in joining of functions 
between those of the executive and those of the council. One of the goals for applying the 
doctrine of separation, however, is to facilitated oversight. That goal may still be attainedwith 
proper use of other mechanisms and structures as will be noted below 
3.3  SECTION 79 COMMITTES AND SECTION 80 COMMITTEE SYSTEMS  
There are a variety of committees that a municipality may establish. Such committees include 
the executive committees,
91
mayoral committees,
92
 ward committees, section 79 and section 
80 committees, and any other committees that may be established by a sub-council of a 
metropolitan municipality.
93
This part of the study is concerned with committees established 
under section 79 of the Structures Act and therefore discusses the same in detail. 
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3.3.1 Section 79 committees 
The general authority to establish committees is provided by the Constitution and 
legislation.
94
 When establishing committees, municipalities are required to take into account 
the extent of the functions, the need for delegation for efficiency and effectiveness, and the 
availability of financial and administrative resources.
95
  In terms of section 79 committees, 
the council appoint members of such committees from amongst the councillors and has 
power to dissolve the committees.
96
 These committees are very useful as they may be used 
for oversight over the executive and administration as they are not report to the executive, as 
will be seen in section 3.3.2 below.
97
 This required purpose can be achieved if the section 79 
committees are made to operate in a manner, with necessary modifications, like portfolio 
committees of Parliament at national level or of provincial legislatures at provincial level. At 
the national level, the committees have been given oversight powers, including the power to 
summon any person and to require any person or institution to report to it.
98
 
It is strongly recommended that to create oversight relationships and better oversight, 
municipalities need to make use of section 79 committees as they are not answerable to the 
executive of the municipality,
99
 as will be seen in contrasting section 79 committees  with 
section 80 committees below. The significance of section 79 committees not answering or 
reporting to the executive would be best understood if section 79 committees are 
distinguished from section 80 committees as done below. 
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3.3.2 Section 80 committees: features and distinction with section 79 committees. 
Section 80 committees and section 79 committees are subject to the same requirements under 
section 79 of the Structures Act. However, they are different to the extent provided in section 
80.
100
 It could be said that section 79 sets the general terms of committees and thus provides a 
genus, whereas section 80 provides for a special kind of section 79 committees and thereby 
provide a species of section 79 committees. This is clear from the use of the phrase “may 
appoint in terms of section 79” in legislation when referring to the authority of the council to 
appoint section 80 committees.
101
 This means they will be established on the general terms 
under section 79, but the special terms under section 80 will apply. 
As was stated earlier, section 80 committees are attached to the executive as the following 
factors show: First, section 80 committees are established to assist the executive committee or 
the executive mayor charged with executive authority of the municipality.
102
 This is in 
contrast with the general rationale of establishing section 79 committees, which are 
appointed, if necessary, for the effective and efficient performance of any of the council‟s 
function or exercise of its powers.
103
 It means that the purpose of section 79 committees have 
not been specified, whereas section 80 committees are specifically established to assist the 
executive.  
Secondly, the chairpersons of the section 80 committees are appointed by the executive 
committee or executive mayor from the executive committee or mayoral committee.
104
 As 
noted elsewhere, municipalities may either have (i) a collective executive system where the 
executive authority is collectively exercised through the executive committee appointed by 
the council, or (ii) an executive mayoral system where the executive authority of the council 
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is exercised through the executive mayor, or (iii) a plenary system where executive authority 
is exercised by the council itself.
105
 
Section 80 committees are only applicable to municipalities with executive committee or 
executive mayor systems,
106
 and the members are appointed from the executive committee or 
mayoral committee. The chairpersons of section 80 committees are thus responsible for a 
particular executive portfolio of the municipality. This is in contrast with chairpersons of 
section 79 committees who are not appointed from the mayoral committee or executive 
committee.
107
 
Thirdly, thecouncil may delegate to section 80 committees some powers and duties of the 
executive committee or executive mayor, which are in essence executive powers and 
duties.
108
 With such an arrangement it cannot be expected that a committee exercising 
executive functions would exercise oversight functions over the executive of the 
municipality, especially when the executive is the one that gives it the powers and duties in 
question. On the other hand, in as far as section 79 committees are concerned, it has not been 
specifically stated that they may be delegated executive functions. The council may delegate 
powers to section 79 committees as it deems fit.
109
 
Fourthly, the decisions of section 80 committees may be varied or revoked by the executive 
committee or executive mayor, making these committees more sub-servient to the executive 
organs of the municipality.
110
 There is no such provision in respect of section 79 committees 
authorising any review or variation of decision, although section 79 committees are subject to 
the council‟s power to review its decisions as the delegating authority.  However, such power 
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of review and variation of section 79 committee decisions may be implied from the council‟s 
power to appoint and dissolve the section 79 committees. In which case, the review and 
variation powers can only be exercised by the council. 
Fifth is that section 80 committees are obligated to report to the executive committee or 
executive mayor in accordance with directions from the executive committee or executive 
mayor.
111
 This clearly shows that section 80 committees receive directions from the 
executive. Section 79 committees do not report to the executive, but are answerable to the 
council as the delegating authority. 
The foregoing factors indicate that section 80 committees are more aligned to the executive 
and they are ill-suited for legislative oversight over the municipal executive.  
The use of section 79 committees for better oversight is further recommended considering 
that the council is responsible for determining the functions and procedure of these 
committees.
112
  With such powers, coupled with the authority to allocate powers and function 
by the use of terms of reference and systems of delegation, municipal councils may give 
requisite powers to section 79 committees to enable them play a significant role in overseeing 
municipal executives. Section 79 committees are, therefore, very important tools of oversight 
over the executive. The possibility of achieving that is, however, very much dependent on the 
powers allocated to them by each municipality and the manner in which other mechanisms of 
oversight are employed. Such other mechanisms for oversight are discussed below. 
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3. 4 MFMA REPORTING SYSTEM: ANNUAL REPORTS AND MID-YEAR 
 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORTS 
The need to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness
113
applies to local 
government sphere of governance as it constitutes a part of the overall government of the 
Republic.
114
 There are a number of ways through which openness and accountability can be 
attained, including through establishing reporting systems that enhance oversight and 
accountability relationships. The notion of transparency and accountability through reporting 
mechanisms in the South African context isthe subject of a number of legislative instruments, 
including the MFMA. In the MFMA, the reporting mechanisms include the following;  
(i) monthly budget statements by the accounting officer to the mayor and the relevant 
provincial treasury; 
(ii) quarterly reports on the implementation of the budget and the financial state of 
affairs of the municipality by the mayor to the council; 
(iii) mid-year budget and performance assessment reporting by the accounting officer 
to the mayor, the National Treasury, the relevant provincial treasury and to the 
council;
115
 
(iv) reports on failure to adopt or implement budget related and other policies to the 
provincial treasury by the accounting officer;
116
 
(v) submission of financial statements after end of financial year to the Auditor 
General for auditing, a reporting obligation of the accounting officer;
117
 
(vi) annual reporting to the council by the mayor followed by adoption of the 
oversight report by the council;
118
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(vii) reporting to the public by the obligation to place information on websites; and  
(viii) the general reporting obligations of the accounting officer to report to the National 
Treasury, provincial treasury, department of local government in the province or 
whenever required.
119
 
All these reporting mechanisms ensure some oversight over the municipal executive and 
the administration. Since this paper deals with legislative oversight and is limited in 
scope, it only discusses the annual reporting and the mid-year budget and performance 
assessment reporting under the Municipal Finance Management Act.
120
 
3.4.1 Annual Reports as mechanisms for oversight 
All municipalities and municipal entities are required to prepare an annual report seven 
months and six months, respectively, after the end of each financial year.
121
 The purpose of 
the annual reports is to provide a record of the activities of the municipality during the 
financial year to which they relate, to provide a report of performance against the budget, and 
to promote accountability to the local community for decisions made during the year.
122
 
Apart from promoting accountability to the local community, annual reports also facilitate 
accountability of the executive and the administration to the council. This is manifest in the 
fact that the mayor tables the report in the council where it is discussed.
123
 At that moment 
the council exercises oversight and can hold the executive and administration to account by 
questioning their performance and compliance with the Service Delivery and Budget 
Implementation Plan (SDBIP).
124
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The oversight character of the annual reporting process is more evident if viewed from the 
requirement by legislation that the council must adopt an oversight report containing the 
council‟s comments on the annual report.125 In addition, the oversight purpose of the annual 
report is manifest in the fact that the municipal manager, who is the head of the municipal 
administration, is obliged to attend council and council committee meetings where the annual 
report is discussed in order to respond to questions concerning the report.
126
 In this instance 
the council is given the platform to exercise what is referred to as ex post oversight over the 
executive.
127
 
The annual reporting makes the oversight process possible due to the nature of its particulars. 
Annual reports of a municipality are required to include the annual financial statements, the 
Auditor General‟s report on those financial statements, the annual performance report, the 
general Auditor General‟s report, an assessment by the municipal manager of any arrears on 
taxes and service charges, among other things.
128
 These particulars in the annual report 
enable the council to make an assessment of the performance of the municipality and of the 
executive organs during the relevant financial year. The council can make necessary 
conclusions and, if necessary, take remedial action. Annual reporting is, for the above 
reasons, a useful tool for the council to utilise in exercising oversight over the executive and 
administration.  
3.4.2 Mid-year budget and performance assessment report as an oversight mechanism 
Another mechanism for legislative oversight is the mid-year budget and performance 
assessment reporting. The municipal manager of a municipality is required to assess the 
performance of the municipality during the first half of the financial year by the 25
th
 of 
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January each year.
129
 There are two oversight relationships that are created by the mid-year 
budget and performance assessment reporting. The first is between the mayor and the 
municipal manager, where the municipal manager reports to the mayor. The second is 
between the mayor and the council, where the mayor reports to the council. In this case the 
executive oversees the administration whereas the council oversees both the executive and 
administration.  
The municipal manager is instructed to assess the implementation of the budget and the 
performance of the municipality and to submit the report to the mayor of the municipality as 
well as to the national and provincial treasuries.
130
 In the process the mayor considers the 
report and assesses whether the budget, in that half year period, has been implemented in 
accordance with the SDBIP. The mayor may revise or give appropriate instructions to the 
accounting officer.
131
 The oversight relationship whereby the mayor oversees the municipal 
manager aligns with the authority vested in the mayor to oversee the exercise of 
responsibilities assigned to the municipal manager and the chief financial officer.
132
 
The mayor upon receipt of the budget and performance assessment report must submit it to 
the council by the 31
st
 of January.
133
This reporting stage enables the council to exercise its 
oversight function on the implementation of the budget and the performance of the 
municipality in general.  
Legislation has, thus, provided mechanisms for executive oversight over the administration 
alongside legislative oversight over the executive and administration. The mid-year budget 
and performance assessment reporting is one such mechanism that can be utilised to enhance 
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oversight in municipalities. If municipalities implement these legislative requirements, better 
oversight can be achieved.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the mechanisms provided by legislation that municipalities may 
use to create separation of powers and better oversight relationship within their structures. A 
selection of these mechanisms has been discussed in detail. It has been noted that the terms of 
reference and the systems of delegation are the mechanisms provided by legislation that can 
be used to create a limited separation or segregation of functions in municipalities and in the 
process create an environment where oversight relationships are better managed. It has also 
been noted that section 79 committees are significant structures for purposes of legislative 
oversight over the executive and administration. The processes of annual reporting and mid-
year budget and performance assessment reporting are additional useful tools that legislation 
has provided to facilitate meaningful legislative oversight over the executive and 
administration of the municipalities. The next chapter considers how the three metropolitan 
municipalities have made use of these mechanisms and structures. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT MODELS OF CAPE TOWN, JOHANNESBURG 
AND EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITIES 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
As noted in chapter one, the study argues that purposeful use of the available mechanisms 
provided by legislation may facilitate a measureof separation of powers and functions as well 
as better oversight. In line with the argument and the objectives of the study, this chapter 
examines how the metropolitan municipalities of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni 
have used these mechanisms to design their governance models with the aim of attaining a 
separation of powers and better oversight. 
The chapter examines the powers, functions and duties allocated to political office bearers 
and structures in the three metropolitan municipalities through the mechanisms of terms of 
reference and delegation. In particular, the chapter considers the allocation of those powers, 
functions and duties to the speaker, the executive mayor, the chief whip, the municipal 
manager and section 79 committees. Further, the chapter will examine the practice and usage 
of annual reporting as well as mid-year budget and performance assessment reporting as tools 
for oversight in the municipalities under study. The main point of consideration is the manner 
in which the mechanisms and structures provided by legislation have been used to separate 
executive from legislative functions, and to facilitate sound oversight. 
4.2  USE OF TERMS OF REFERENCE AND SYSTEMS OF DELEGATION  
This part discusses the approaches used in drawing up terms of reference and systems of 
delegation, before analysing the use of terms ofreference and delegations. 
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4.2.1 The terms of reference, systems of delegation and the various approaches  
There are two approaches the metropolitan municipalities have used in drawing up the terms 
of reference and delegations to office bearers. The first approach is either combining the 
terms of reference and system of delegations in the same document or to separate the terms of 
reference from delegations. The former is referred to as the combined system, whereas the 
latter is the separated system. This classification is premised on the fact that legislation 
allows the inclusion of delegation in the same document laying down the terms of reference, 
although it is not mandatory.
134
Municipalities may, therefore, opt to combine the two or 
separate them. 
The other approach, the terms of reference or delegations of different office bearers and 
structures are either laid down in one comprehensive document, or are in separate documents 
for each office bearer or structure. These are comprehensive and detached system of terms of 
referencing and/or delegation, respectively. 
The City of Cape Town has a system of delegations which also provides the terms of 
reference for all political office bearers and structures compiled in one document. The current 
system of delegations was adopted by the council on 1
st
 of June 2011.
135
 
The City of Johannesburg has also complied with the requirements of legislation by 
providing roles and responsibilities to office bearers and structures in the terms of reference 
which are combined with delegations to the respective office bearers or structures. The City 
of Johannesburg, however, has not adopted a comprehensive systemof terms of referencing 
and delegation. The terms of reference and delegations for each office bearer and structure 
are in a separate detached document for each of such office bearer or structure. There is, thus, 
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a combined but detached system of terms of referencing and delegation at City of 
Johannesburg which has been in place since 2008.
136
 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, on the other hand, has comprehensive and combined 
terms of reference and delegations for office bearers and structures. The terms of reference 
and the delegations are provided together and are compiled in one document for all office 
bearers and structures. Their comprehensive system of delegations were adopted by the 
council on 7
th
 September 2011 and updated in March 2012.
137
 
Legislation has entrusted some powers and authority to office bearers and structures. For 
instance, the functions of the speaker and executive mayor have already been outlined by 
legislation.
138
The same applies to a number of other office bearers and structures. For that 
reason, all the three metropolitan municipalities‟ terms of reference or system of delegations 
have first acknowledged and included the roles and responsibilities allocated by legislation in 
respect of office bearers and structures. Thereafter, they allocate and delegate to the office 
bearers and structure as outlined below. 
4.2.2  Allocation of powers and functions to office bearers through terms of reference 
and delegations 
There is a difference in scope in terms of the subjects of the terms of reference and those of 
the system of delegations. Terms of reference are for political office bearers, political 
structures and the municipal manager.
139
 On the other hand, delegation may also be made to 
any councillors, whether holding political office or not, and to staff members, in addition to 
the political office bearer, political structure and municipal manager.
140
 A political office 
bearer is defined as meaning the speaker, the executive mayor, deputy executive mayor, the 
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mayor, deputy mayor, or a member of the executive committee.
141
 These, and the municipal 
manager, are the office bearers for which terms of reference may be made. All office bearers 
being assessed in this part, i.e., the speaker and the executive mayor are within the definition 
of political office bearer subject to terms of reference, except for the chief whip. The chief 
whip is not a political office bearer and the drawing of terms of reference is not mandatory. 
All the metropolitan municipalities under study, however, have made terms of reference for 
the chief whip. In that regard, for the purpose of this study, the chief whip is considered as a 
political office bearer. 
4.2.2.1 The Speaker 
In terms ofsection 37 of the Structures Act, the speaker isin charge of the council processes. 
The terms of reference and delegations of the municipalities under review have entrusted 
similar powers and functions to the speaker. As far as delegations are concerned, the speaker 
of the City of Cape Town, for instance, has been given powers to oversee the council 
chamber and coordinate functions of sub councils.
142
 He or she has the power to determine 
administrative arrangements for ward meetings as well as to oversee their establishment and 
coordination, to monitor them, and report and recommend to the council on the performance 
of sub councils, ward forums, as well as section 79 committees. The sub-councils and ward 
forums serve the purpose of the council processes and therefore under the overall authority of 
the speaker.  The speaker is also responsible for the expenditure of his or her office, and has 
the duty to enforce rules for declaration of assets and interest.
143
 
Most of the powers delegated to the Speaker correspond with the powers and 
functionsalready given by statute and are generally related to the council processes, rules of 
order, code of conduct and integrity of the council. There are no detailed executive or 
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administrative functions, except as they relate to the office of the speaker. The scope of 
allocation of responsibilities ensures that the office of the speaker is separated from the 
executive and administration, and at the same time independent. 
 Similarly, in the City of Johannesburg, the speaker has authority on matters that relate to 
community involvement, mechanisms to build the capacity of councillors and communities, 
on systems to manage petitions, on official languages of the City, on projects in respect of the 
functions of the Speaker‟s office, and the monitoring and regulation of the performance of 
ward committees.
144
The speaker also has authority toapprove amendments to the 
organisational structure of the Office of the Speaker.As a check on the exercise of power by 
the speaker, the speaker has the responsibility of reporting to the Section 79 Rules Committee 
quarterly on the activities of the office of the Speaker.
145
 The responsibilities and the 
functions of the speaker include some administrative and executive related functions, but 
only in so far as they relate to the office of the speaker. Such allocation of administrative and 
executive functions is necessary to keep the speaker independent from the executive. That 
enhances the separated status of the speaker from the executive mayor. Overall, however, the 
responsibility of managing expenditure for the whole of the municipality rests with the 
municipal manager.
146
 
In Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, the powers and functions of the speaker have been 
categorised into three. These are; (a) those related to public participation under which the 
speaker has been given the authority of approving mechanisms devised to involve the 
community in the affairs of the City, to approve all systems to manage petitions, and to 
monitor and regulate the performance of ward committees, among others; (b) authority 
related to the legislature under which the speaker has responsibility  to submit reports and 
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recommendations to the council and to committees on matters within the scope of the 
committees, and to ensure development of standing rules of the council as well as to ensure 
that  ward committees are set up; and (c) the general powers and functions under which the 
speaker is the convener of programming and rules committees and other related functions.
147
 
The powers of the speaker relate to the council processes, meetings, petitions, ward 
committees and council committees. There are virtually no executive or administrative 
functions except those related to the speaker‟s office. In terms of separation of powers, the 
authority of the speaker has been delimited to the council, ward committee and petition 
processes. They are functions dealing with the council as opposed to the executive. These are, 
therefore, specialised functions of the speaker differentiated from executive and 
administrative functions. It is a significant step towards the segregation of powers and 
functions of the speaker from those of the executive and administration. The arrangement 
creates relationships conducive to oversight and efficiency. 
4.2.2.2 The Chief Whip 
None of the metropolitan municipalities under review make mention of any statutory powers 
and functions of the chief whip because the chief whip is not an office established by 
legislation and is also not within the definition of political office as earlier noted. However, 
the terms of reference for the municipalities under review have allocated functions to the 
chief whip. As was stated above, terms of reference can be made to political office bearers, 
the definition of which does not include the chief whip. The allocation of powers and 
functions to the chief whip in terms of reference is not mandatory. In terms of delegation, 
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nevertheless, there is an express legal authorisation since a chief whip is a councillor to 
whom the council may delegate as permitted by legislation.
148
 
In the case of City of Cape Town, the functions of the chief whip seem to be closely related 
to those of the speaker. They include the power to approve, in consultation with the speaker, 
the use of office and meeting space by councillors and political parties, to grant leave of 
absence to councillors from meetings of the council and committees, to determine 
developmental needs of councillors in consultation with party whips and to develop a 
programme of training for the councillors.
149
 The main functions of the office in summary is 
to co-ordinate between the council and the political parties, to assist the speaker in some 
council processes where political parties‟ input is required, and coordinates the office of the 
speaker to the political parties.  
A situation at City of Johannesburg is quite similar. The chief whip has powers and functions 
mainly dealing with the relationships and co-ordination between all political parties, the 
maintenance of discipline among all councillors, the approval of requests by any political 
party to conduct meetings, ensuring the allocation of councillors to the various committees, 
attending to disputes between political parties, among others.
150
However, there are some 
powers and functions allocated to the Chief Whip which may be rightly classified as 
executive or administrative, only in so far as they are related to the functions of the office of 
the Chief Whip.  
In the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality the Chief Whip is also responsible for 
maintaining working relationships between political parties in the council and as well as for 
allocation of councillors to committees in consultation with the speaker and party whips. He 
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or she is responsible for coming up with a strategy for effective debate. The Chief Whip, in 
consultation with the speaker, nominates councillors to attend national and international 
seminars, congresses, or meetings subject to council‟s policy and delegation.151 
What can be observed, in as far as separation and segregation of powers is concerned, is that 
the functions of the Chief Whip‟s office revolves around council related processes and 
functions as opposed to executive functions. The allocation of functions of the chief Whip in 
such a manner contributes to the segregation of the executive and legislative powers and 
functions at municipal level. 
4.2.2.3 The Executive Mayor 
The municipalities under review have allocated powers and functions to the executive mayor 
in a manner that separateslegislative and executive functions. They have adopted the 
executive mayoral system which, by legislation, vests the executive leadership in the 
executive mayor.
152
 The terms of reference and systems of delegation have allocated and 
delegated powers and functions to the office of the executive mayor in a similar manner.  
The system of delegations in the City of Cape Town allocates and delegates to the executive 
mayor civil and ceremonial duties such as receiving delegates, making media statements, 
opening projects, presenting honours and mementos, and powers to appoint senior officials of 
utility agencies, as well as determine appropriate policies to be adopted by the council.
153
 The 
executive mayor exercises the council‟s executive authority in a similar way as exercised by 
the President at national level or a premier at the provincial level. The difference is that in the 
case of the President or a premier the powers are directly conferred by the Constitution or 
legislation and are not exercised on behalf of Parliament or the provincial legislature. The 
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executive mayor, however, merely exercises executive authority of the council
154
 and the 
council itself may, in appropriate cases, exercise the executive functions.
155
 Nevertheless, 
there is some notable demarcation between the executive powers exercised under the 
leadership of the executive mayor and the functions and processes under the control of the 
speaker.  
In the City of Johannesburg, thegeneral function of the executive mayor, according to the 
terms of reference, is the execution of executive powers or duties on behalf of the Council. 
That power is subject to powers reserved for the Council and those delegated to any political 
structure, political office bearer, councillor or official.
156
 Specifically, the executive mayor 
has authority in municipal relations, finance, municipal services and entities and authority on 
legal and staff matters.
157
 These are executive functions as was defined by the court in 
Fedsure and Mnquma decisions discussed earlier.
158
 The manner in which the powers have 
been allocated, there is a degree of separation and segregation of powers and functions 
between the executive headed by the executive mayor and the powers, functions and 
processes of the council.  
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, in the wording of the system of delegations, has 
transferred the execution of all powers, functions and duties of the council to the executive 
mayor, subject to what has been specifically provided by legislation or delegation.
159
 Under 
legislation, however, the executive power may be exercised with assistance of orin 
conjunction with the members of the mayoral committee.
160
 The broad delegation of all 
executive functions to the executive mayor gives the executive mayor wider powers than is 
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the case in the other metropolitan municipalities under review. It is clear from the system of 
delegations that the executive powers and functions have been entrusted to the executive 
mayor with the aid of the mayoral committee, whereas the rest of the powers and functions 
remain with the council.  
The designation by legislation of the executive mayor as the head of the executive functions 
sets a paradigm that is being followed by the municipalities assessed.  However, the 
executive mayor and members of the mayoral committees are councillors and remain 
members of the council. They are a separate functionary when exercising executive functions, 
and yet part and parcel of the council when it exercises its legislative and oversight functions. 
The executive mayor and the mayoral committees are elected from the council and they 
continue to be members of the council at all times until council membership ends. Regardless 
of the fact that the executive mayor, executive committee members or mayoral 
committeemembers form part of the council, there is a limitedsegregation between the 
executive functionary and the council which allows the council to exercise oversight over the 
executive. 
4.2.2.4 The Municipal Manager 
By legislation the municipal manager is the head of the administration of the municipality.
161
 
He or she is accountable and responsible for the administration‟s formation, development and 
management in an efficient, economical and legislative compliant manner.
162
 The terms of 
reference and system of delegations of the municipalities assessed are cognisant of the 
powers and functions of the municipal manager in terms of legislation. They have allocated 
or delegated the powers and functions in a manner that does not contradict with those 
allocated by legislation.  
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At the City of Cape Town, the municipal manager has been allocated powers to appoint 
senior officers such as the chief fire officer, the head of political management centre and the 
deputy information officers. The authority of the municipal manager includes the power to 
develop systems of personnel administration, powers in relation to procurement, and the 
authority to authorise certain legal processes, among others.
163
It does not differ much from 
the powers and functions of the municipal manager of the City of Johannesburg where his or 
her principal function is to assist the executive mayor in complying with his or her 
responsibility in respect of powers and functions reserved for the council.
164
However, the 
designation of the function of the municipal manager is a bit generic and it seems to suggest 
that the municipal manger performs functions which are executive in nature, over and above 
the administrative functions.  
In Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality the municipal manager has been delegated powers 
to initiate policy and by-laws, powers to appoint temporary employees and students, powers 
to dismiss staff, to grant leave and some functions in relation to supply chain management, 
among others.
165
 These are administrative functions and do not differ in substance with the 
other two metropolitan municipalities under review. The allocation is also in line with the 
designation by legislation of the municipal manager as head of the administration. 
The powers and functions allocated or delegated to municipal managers in the three 
metropolitan municipalities under study can well be classified as administrative. However, 
the separation of the administrative functions from the executive functions is not that 
obvious. Some of the functions allocated to the municipal manager are executive functions. 
This is more manifest in the City of Johannesburg where the general function of the 
municipal manager is to assist the executive mayor. In addition to that, it is necessaryto draw 
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a clear distinguishing line between the executive functions and the administrative functions to 
avoid instances where the executive may encroach in administrative matters. The exercise of 
administrative powers and functions of the municipal managers has been subjected to policy 
direction of the municipal council.
166
 The council has the power to involve itself in 
administrative matters through policy. The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the 
Manana
167
 case, which held that the administrative functions to appoint staff of a 
municipality can also be exercised by the council itself, further distorts the distinction line 
between administration and the council. The effect of the court decision is that it allows the 
council to exercise powers and functions of the administration, whether given by statute or 
delegation.
168
 
4.3  UTILISATION OF SECTION 79 COMMITTES AS STRUCTURES FOR 
OVERSIGHT 
Municipalities may allocate oversight powers and functions to structures to facilitate 
oversight.The structures that may be used include section 79 committees. Section 79 
committees have been used by the municipalities for oversight functions and will be 
examined in this part. The focus of the examination is on the roles and responsibilities 
allocated to the section 79 committees and whether these committees do facilitate oversight.. 
4.3.1 City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality 
The City of Cape Townhas divided its section 79 committees into two groups; section 79 
portfolio committees and section 79 standing committees.  
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4.3.1.1 Portfolio Committees 
There are eleven portfolio committees at the City of Cape Town.
169
  These being section 79 
committees, their members and chairpersons are appointed by the council. The portfolio 
committees have generic functions which include development of policy, drafting of by-laws 
and business plans, and making recommendations on the draft IDP, budget, tariffs, levies, 
taxes and duties. The portfolio committees assessthe performance of service delivery within 
the functional area of the committee and they monitor outcomes, identify needs of the 
municipality and make recommendations to the executive mayor. They have the power to 
require councillors and/or officials to appear before any of these committees to assist in the 
performance of its duties.
170
 The power to summonis significant in terms of performance of 
oversight functions. 
Each executive portfolio is constantly overseen and supervised by the committees. From the 
point of view of the definition of executive function as explained in the Mnquma case above, 
the function to develop policy is an executive function. In this particular case, however, it has 
been allocated to the portfolio committees. The way this executive function has been 
allocated to the portfolio committees does not align with the notion of separation of powers. 
Portfolio committees are made under section 79 of the Structures Act and ought to be 
separated from the executive and ought not exercise executive functions. In terms of 
oversight, the efficiency in overseeing the municipal executive may be impeded by the fact 
that the committees are actively involved in executive functions. 
4.3.1.2 Standing Committees 
There are also other section 79 committees loosely referred to as standing committees. These 
are the Homeless Agency Committee, the Rules Committee, the Standing Committee of 
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Public Accounts (SCOPA) and the Spatial Planning, Environment and Land Use 
Management Committee (SPELUM). The Homeless Agency Committee has political 
oversight functions on matters related to homeless people and makes recommendations to the 
executive mayor.
171
 
The Rules Committees is responsible for rules of procedure of the council, sub councils and 
committees. It reports to the council and not the executive mayor. The Rules Committee does 
not have any oversight functions over the executive.
172
 
SCOPA performs oversight functions over the executive functionarieson behalf of the 
council.
173
 This is the strongest committee in terms of oversight. It is allocated the power to 
review financial statements, audit reports and annual reports, including overseeing the 
adoption of the oversight report.
174
 It is specifically responsible for promoting good 
governance, transparency and accountability on the use of municipal resources and therefore 
vested with power to investigate and advise the council in respect of unauthorised, irregular 
or fruitless and wasteful expenditure.
175
 To enable it exercise its functions it has been vested 
with the power to access any information, documents and reports and to require councillors, 
officials, chairpersons of municipal entity boards and directors to attend any meeting or 
interview and report on matters on agenda.
176
 Thus, apart from portfolio committees which 
are charged with oversight functions, SCOPA has also been entrusted with oversight powers 
over the executive and administration. Standing committees have specific functions and are 
generally responsible for that function in the council, whereas portfolio committees oversee a 
particular portfolio. 
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4.3.2 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
The City of Johannesburg has also made use of section 79 committees. It has categorised 
section79 committees into two; section 79 portfolio committees and section 79 standing 
committees.
177
 
4.3.2.1 Section 79 Portfolio Committees 
The portfolio committees have the responsibility to oversee the activities of a particular 
executive portfolio. The City of Johannesburg has an executive mayoral system of a 
municipality having a mayoral committee in which each member is responsible for an 
executive portfolio. According to the terms of reference, the section 79 portfolio committees 
are given generic functions which are classified as legislative, financial and oversight 
functions.  
The legislative functions of the committees include the consideration of draft IDP and 
overseeing its implementation , the implementation of by-laws and policies, and  deliberating 
on the annual report in as far as it relate to the respective portfolio. The financial functions 
are the consideration of draft budgets and draft tariffs, fees and charges in respect of the 
respective portfolio. The oversight functions includethe consideration of matters referred to 
the committees by the Member of the Mayoral Committee (MMC) of the relevant portfolio, 
overseeing the particular portfolio, and the consideration of quarterly reports from the 
relevant MMC and departments.
178
The section 79 portfolio committees at Johannesburg are 
designed to facilitate oversight. First, they have not been allocated executive function nor are 
they answerable to the executive, but they are separated from the executive. Secondly, they 
have been allocated powers and functions that enable the committees to remain watchful over 
the executive.  
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4.3.2.2 Section 79 Standing Committees 
Apart from section 79 Portfolio Committees, there are also section 79 standing committees 
which are five in number. The Municipal Public Account Committee (MPAC) is the standing 
committee which has been entrusted with strong political oversight functions.
179
 According to 
the terms of reference, MPAC is responsible for overseeing the financial statements and 
annual report of the municipality and its entities. It monitors expenditure of the municipality 
to ensure that the budget and SDBIP are complied with.
180
 These are very critical functions of 
MPAC. The MPAC has the right to request any member of staff of the City or its entities, any 
councillor or member of a Board of the entities to attend meetings of the Committee. This is 
very important in the exercise of the MPAC‟s oversight function as it allows the committee to 
call any person and require production of any documents or make any explanation as may be 
necessary. The standing committee are therefore for a specific function as opposed to 
portfolio committees which generally oversees a particular portfolio. 
4.3.3 Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality  
At Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, section 79 committees are categorised into section 
79 political management committees, section 79 portfolio committees and section 79 standing 
committees. 
4.3.3.1 Section 79 Political Management Committees 
There are three political management committees; the Rules Committee, Programming 
Committee and the Ethics and Disciplinary Committee.
181
 The political management 
committees are categorised as legislative committeesby the system of delegations itself. They 
do not have any oversight functions but are responsible for the management of the affairs of 
councillors and processes relating to councillors. These committees do not have significant 
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bearing on the separation of powers of the municipality, although they have a bearing on 
oversight, especially in the rules making process. 
4.3.3.2 Section 79 Portfolio Committees 
Section 79 portfolio committees are referred to in the system of delegations for Ekurhuleni as 
oversight committees.
182
 They are each linked to a specific executive portfolio or department. 
They are vested with generic functions, including overseeing the activities of departments 
within their area of responsibility, the consideration of policy and by-laws as it relates to the 
particular relevant department and the making of recommendations thereof to the council. 
These portfolio committees also have powers of programming and scheduling of debates on 
matters of public interest. They are responsible for monitoring and overseeing budgets, 
expenditure and service delivery of their relevant departments, and to consider as well as 
make recommendations to the council.
183
 These committees are designed as structures of 
oversight over the executive.  
4.3.3.3 Section 79 Standing/specialised Committees 
There are also section 79 standing committees one of which is the MPAC. The system of 
Delegations of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality has classified the MPAC as a 
specialised committee.
184
 It has oversight functions and has the responsibility to foster 
accountability. It oversees all programmes of the municipality and investigates value for 
money on projects, planning and general expenditure.
185
The MPAC has powers to summon 
any person to give evidence as well as hold public hearings and to instruct individuals and 
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committees to be present and answer questions.
186
 This enables the MPAC to exercise its 
functions effectively.  
4.4  THE PRACTICE OF ANNUAL REPORTING AND MID-YEAR BUDGET 
AND  PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORTING  
The MFMA requires municipalities to report its activities annually through an annual report, 
and mid-way in a financial year, through a mid-year budget and performance assessment.
187
 
This is one of the mechanisms put in place by legislation to facilitate transparency, 
accountability and oversight. This part of the study examines how the legislative 
requirements have been put in practice in the municipalities under review to facilitate 
oversight. The examination begins with the annual reporting, followed by the mid-year 
reporting. 
4.4.1 Annual reporting as an oversight process 
4.4.1.1 Annual Reporting at City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality 
The City of Cape Town restates the legal requirement of annual reporting as provided by the 
MFMA.
188
 First, the system of delegations has given the Executive Mayor the power to 
present the annual report to the council.
189
 This is however nothing more than what the 
MFMA has provided. The system of delegations in this respect has defined “presenting” to 
include preparing.
190
 It is, therefore, the responsibility of the executive mayor to prepare and 
table the annual report in the council as required by legislation. The preparation of the annual 
report by the executive mayor is coordinated by the municipal manager.
191
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The City of Cape Town has delegated to SCOPA the function of exercising oversight over 
the annual report.
192
 SCOPA considers and evaluates the City‟s annual report as well as 
annual reports of municipal entities under it. As an oversight committee, it makes 
recommendations on the annual report to the council through an oversight report. It further 
has powers to review and follow up on past recommendations. This practice is in line with 
guidelines from the National Treasury under MFMA Circular no 32 which recommends the 
use of MPACs as oversight committees.
193
 In practice, the process of considering the annual 
report after it is tabled in the council entails that all portfolio committees and sub councils are 
furnished with copies of the annual report. They then deliberate on it and submit their 
comments to SCOPA. SCOPA organises a meeting with the executive management where all 
necessary concerns on the annual report are raised and discussed. Thereafter SCOPA drafts 
an oversight report and makes recommendations to the council on whether to adopt the 
annual report or not.
194
 The Council considers and deliberates on the oversight report and 
either adopts the annual report or rejects it with recommendations.
195
 
The practice of annual reporting at City of Cape Town creates an opportunity for the council 
and the committee to consider the performance of the executive and raise queries and make 
recommendations, if necessary. The process facilitates ex-post oversight opportunity over the 
executive. However, the practice is not only resulting from the use of internal rules of 
procedure, but also from the prescriptions of the MFMA and the circulars made under the 
MFMA by the National Treasury.  
                                                          
192
 City of Cape Town System of Delegations 134. 
193
 City of Cape Town Oversight Report on Annual Report for the 2010/2011 Financial Year 2. 
194
 City of Cape Town Oversight Report on Annual Report for the 2010/2011 Financial Year 2. 
195
MFMA circular number 32 and s 129 MFMA. 
 55 
 
4.4.1.2  Annual Reporting at City of Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality 
In the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality the practice is almost the same,
196
 
except for the fact that it has not specifically obliged the executive mayor to prepare the 
annual report. The duty of the executive mayor is merely to table the annual report in the 
Council. Similar to the City of Cape Town, section 79 Portfolio committees consider the 
annual report, especially as it relates to their respective portfolio and make recommendations 
accordingly to the council.
197
 TheMPAC of the City of Johannesburg is also allocated the 
responsibility to exercise some oversight through the annual report process and it makes 
recommendations to the council and the executive mayor. The MPAC, as required by the 
guidelines of the National Treasury,
198
 drafts an oversight report after scrutinising the annual 
report and receiving necessary comments and input from relevant individuals and organs. It 
then makes recommendations to the council whether to approve or reject the annual report. 
The councilthen deliberates on the oversight report and must either adopt or reject the annual 
report. 
In Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality the process is almost the same, except that the 
responsibility of ensuring the preparation of annual report and financial statements rests with 
the Member of the Mayoral Committee (MMC) for Finance.
199
 It is observed that vesting the 
responsibility on the MMC is not advisable. Legislation requires that the annual report 
betabled by the executive mayor. It is recommended that the person responsible for tabling 
should be the person preparing the report to ensure that he or she is well aware of its contents. 
After the annual report is tabled in the council, it is referred to the MPAC.MPAC considers 
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and scrutinisesthe report after receiving comments from various stakeholders, including the 
portfolio committees, and makes recommendations to the council through an oversight report 
whether to adopt the annual report or not.
200
 
4.4.1.3 Analysis of the Annual Report Processes 
The above is the standard process in the local context of the municipalities under review in 
respect of annual reporting. In the process, proper oversight by the council entails a 
meaningful debate and engagement by the council on the annual report when it is first tabled 
and after it is referred back with an MPAC oversight report. The reality on the ground does 
not show meaningful engagement by the council or committees, except in MPAC. For 
instance, in the City of Cape Town, there were concerns raised by the chairperson of SCOPA 
that portfolio committees were not deliberating sufficiently on the annual report when 
referred to them. They were merely taking note of the report.
201
 It was pointed out that the 
lack of deliberation was caused by the fact that most councillors and chairs of portfolio 
committees did not take an offer to undergo training. The scenario is indicative of poor 
capacity of councillors and committees to meaningfully deliberate on the annual report. This 
is attributed to the lack of comprehension of the annual report by most of the councillors.
202
 
The lack of capacity to meaningfully deliberate also exists in the other metropolitan 
municipalities. In Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, for example, the trend is that a 
report is merely noted in the council and referred to MPAC without much debate. For 
instance, when the Auditor General presented a report to the council, the council merely took 
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note of the report and referred it to MPAC for oversight.
203
 This indicates a tendency of 
overreliance on MPACs for scrutiny and questioning, and reduces the council‟s role to one of 
merely endorsing what is in the reports. Although the MPACs do provide oversight on behalf 
of the council, the council needs to engage in a meaningful debate on the annual report for 
effective and efficient oversight. 
A process of annual reporting does facilitate consideration by the council, MPAC, portfolio 
committees and other organs of the performance and progress of the municipality. It is a 
practice that is in place in the metropolitan municipalities under. However, there are notable 
deficiencies in the nature of the debate and deliberations in the council and committees. It is 
recommended that measures should be put in place to train and build the capacity of 
councillors to enable them engage in the council and committee deliberation. 
4.4.2 Mid-year budget and performance assessment reporting as an oversight process 
The municipalities under study have also localised the requirements for the municipal 
manager assesses the performance of the municipality in course of implementing the budget 
and submit a report to the executive mayor.  The executive mayor then submits a report to the 
council.
204
The process in the metropolitan municipalities under review is discussed below. 
4.4.2.1  City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality 
In the case of the City of Cape Town, the responsibility has been split. The Finance 
Directorate submits the financial assessment part. ThePerformance Management Department 
compiles a report on service delivery performance assessment.
205
 In that respect, the 
municipal manager has the responsibility of coordinating the process to make sure that they 
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are combined before submitting to the executive mayor.
206
 The executive mayor then reports 
to the council.  
4.4.2.2  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
In the City of Johannesburg the practice appears to be reliant on legislation.There 
isnodedicated policy of the City setting out the process. The practice, nevertheless, is that 
each department and entity submits a mid-term budget and performance assessment to the 
municipal manager where it is consolidated and dealt with as required by legislation. It is 
submitted to the mayor who in turn summits it to the council.   
4.4.2.3 Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
In Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality the Budget Implementation Policy provides a guide 
on the mid-year budget and performance assessment.  As per the policy, the practice stems 
from the assessment of the Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) 
results. This process is informed by MFMA Circular No 13 of the National Treasury.
207
 The 
accounting officer, according to the policy, is responsible for the assessment report in line 
with what legislation has prescribed.
208
In case there are any financial budget adjustments 
which may be made as a result of the review, they are facilitated by the finance department 
but are in practice referred to the Budget steering committee
209
 and portfolio committees 
which will make recommendations before the council adopts them.
210
 The process allows the 
council and its committees to exercise oversight over the executive and administration against 
budget and SDBIP. The practice provides an opportunity for the council to oversee the 
executive and administration midway through the implementation of the budget and SDBIP, 
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thereby providing concurrent oversight.The localisation of the process ensures increased 
oversight avenues and contributes to overall better oversight. 
4.5  CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MODELS 
This part analyses the models of governance in the municipalities under review and answers 
the questions whether there is a separation of powers in the municipalities under review or 
whether existing practices do facilitate meaningful oversight. 
4.5.1 The systems of governance and separation of powers 
The main question to consider in this part is whether the systems of governance in the 
metropolitan municipalities under review delineate executive powers and functions from 
legislative powers and functions. Before attempting to answer the question, it is pertinent to 
make general observations in relation to the common practice in jurisdictions where the 
doctrine of separation of powers is applied. The first observation is that there is no universal 
model of separation of powers.
211
 Each constitutional regime designs its own model or 
manner of separation of powers. This also applies to municipalities when designing their own 
systems of governance. The second observation is that in any democratic system with 
separation of powers and checks and balances, there cannot be an absolute separation of the 
executive and legislature. What normally exist are schemes of partial separation and partial 
interaction, other than wholly disjointed executive and legislature.
212
 
In answering the question whether the models under review have a separation of powers, it is 
suggested that the approach taken by the Constitutional Court in the Certification judgment
213
 
should be used. In answering the question whether the 1996 Constitution provides a 
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separation of powers as was required in the Constitutional Principles,
214
 the Constitutional 
Court rejected the contention that since there was no complete separation, the requirement 
was not satisfied.
215
 It was observed that even though the members of the executive forms 
part of Parliament and provincial legislature, there is a separation of powers as legislative 
functions are vested in parliament and provincial legislature, while executive functions are in 
the President and the premier, respectively.
216
 
In assessing the models of the metropolitan municipalities, a similar question as to whether 
there is a separation of powers arises. The approach used by the Constitutional Court in the 
Certification judgment may be used, with due consideration of the following factors. First, all 
the three municipalities have drawn a line between the executive and the council. 
Nevertheless, the executive and the council still integrate in the sense that members of the 
executive are also members of the council and the executive is answerable and accounts to 
the council. Secondly, the powers, functions and responsibilities have been allocated in a 
segregated manner by the three metropolitan municipalities.The powers, functions and 
responsibility of the council processes are under the leadership of the speaker, the chief whip, 
or the chairpersons of the committees. On the other hand, the powers, functions and 
responsibility of initiating policy, by-laws, budget, IDP and execution of the functions of the 
municipality are essentially under the leadership of the executive mayor. If the approach 
taken by the Constitutional Courtin determining whether there is a separation of powers is 
used, it may be concluded that there is a separation of powers in these municipalities. 
The above conclusion, however, is muted by the Constitution and legislation. The 
Constitution and legislation both expressly vest executive and legislative authority in the 
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council,
217
which is in contradiction with the conclusion. Furthermore, drawing such a 
conclusion would be inconsistentwith legislation on two reasons. First, the allocation of 
responsibilities in the terms of reference must be within legislative framework.
218
 To 
conclude that there is a separation of powers would contradict section 11(1) of the Systems 
Act which provides for a conflation of powers. Secondly, it is strictly required that delegation 
may not conflict with the Constitution, the Systems Act and the Structures Act.
219
 Construing 
the practice in the three municipalities as creating a separation of powers, on a system partly 
created by delegations, would not be in line with the requirements set by legislation on 
delegation.  
With such limitations in the Constitution and legislation, it is submitted that instead of stating 
that there is a separation of powers in these three municipalities, or in any municipality, the 
correct approach should be to state that there is a separation of functions. Maintaining that 
there is a separation of powers, in the sense of the doctrine, runs counter to the Constitution 
and legislation.  Further to that, most of the powers and functions allocated to the executive 
are either delegated or vested by legislation and may be revoked or exercised by the council 
itself.
220
If the approach taken by the Constitutional Court in the Certification judgment is 
used, the practice in the three metropolitan municipalities separating the council and the 
executivemay be said to be a separation of powers in the sense of the doctrine.However, the 
clear vesting of both executive and legislative powers to the council by the Constitution and 
legislation, and the overriding power of the council to exercise any of the executive functions, 
whittles down the separation of powers.  
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Regardless of the fact that the separation of powers between the executive and the council in 
the municipalities under review is whittled down,the practice in those metropolitan 
municipalities may still facilitate oversight over the executive. An elaborate assessment on 
whether the governance models under review facilitate oversight is done below. 
4.5.2 The systems of governance and facilitation of oversight 
A question that this part attempts to answer is whether the systems in the three metropolitan 
municipalities do facilitate oversight relationships and avenues that may translate to effective 
oversight. An assessment of the models indicates that the metropolitan municipalities have 
adopted models of governance, and have made use of legislative mechanisms that have the 
potential of enhancing oversight over the executive and administration. Such a conclusion is 
drawn on consideration of the following factors;- 
(i) The executive is appointed by the council through elections,221 and may be removed 
from office by the council.222This makes the executive answerable to the council,a 
mechanism that is provided by legislation and is being practiced in the models 
examined. 
(ii) The executive mayor reports back to the council in terms of all decisions taken by 
him or her.223 He or she reports to the council on the performance of delegated 
powers and exercise of functions as any officer bearer or structure receiving 
delegated powers.224 These reporting requirements and mechanisms allow the council 
to exercise oversight over the executive mayor. 
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(iii) There is some segregation between the executive and the council which allows the 
executive to exercise their functions and the council to review, monitor, recommend 
and direct. The segregation, however, is limited by overriding powers of the council 
and the fact that members of the executive also form part of the council. 
(iv) The section 79 committees in the three metropolitan municipalities have been 
allocated significant oversight functions which are exercised on behalf of the council 
over the executive.  
(v) The localised reporting mechanisms which are provided by legislation allow the 
council to oversee the executive and administration.  
In a fair summation, the models in the municipalities reviewed provide structures, 
mechanisms and processes conducive to or likely to enhanceoversight. Regardless of the 
existence of such structures, mechanisms, processes and avenues for oversight, there is a lack 
of capacity on the part of the councillors to appreciate the reports and engage meaningfully. 
4.6  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has noted that the metropolitan municipalities of Cape Town, Johannesburg and 
Ekurhuleni use the terms of reference and systems of delegation to allocate powers and 
functions to office bearers and structures in a manner separating the executive and the 
council. By giving the speaker control over legislative processes and the executive mayor 
control over executive functions, legislation seems to intend some degree of separation 
between the councilpowers and functions and the executive powers and functions 
in.However, such intent is muted by the Constitution and legislation providing that all 
executive and legislative powers arevested in the council. It allows exercise by the council of 
all executive functions delegated or allocated by legislation and thus deviates from the 
doctrine of separation of powers. 
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The chapter  has observed noted that the municipalities under review have entrusted, through 
the use of terms of reference and delegations, oversight functions to section 79 committees. 
The allocation of oversight functions to the section 79 committees allows the committees to 
constantly oversee the performance of the executive and administration. 
The chapter further considered the usage of an annual and mid-year reporting as useful tools 
of oversight, but found the challenge of lack of meaningful deliberations on the reports when 
submitted in the council. Lastly, it is noted that the practice in the metropolitan municipalities 
under review does provide for some segregation between executive and the council, but the 
same cannot properly be called a separation of powers in the sense of the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
 
CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS, BEST PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
In the foregoing chapter the use of mechanisms and structures provided by legislation in the 
municipalities under review was examined. The examination considered how the 
municipalities have made use of the mechanisms and structures to design their governance 
systems in an effort to separate executive and legislative functions and to facilitate better 
oversight.  Guided by the argument that purposeful use of the mechanisms provided by 
legislation may translate into a system of separation of powers and better oversight, this 
chapter presents the findings with regard to questions it set out to answer. The findings centre 
on the mechanisms and how they have been employed, the state of oversight structures and 
delimitation of powers, and the best practices. The chapter concludes with recommendations 
on the way forward. 
5.2 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
From the evaluation and review of the legal framework, the governance structures and 
prevalent practices in the metropolitans under review, the following findings and conclusions 
have been made:- 
5.2.1 The legal framework, separation of powers and oversight 
1. The constitutional scheme and legislation provide for a combination of powers and 
functions in the municipal council. This arrangement is justified on various reasons, 
including the view that municipalities do not deal with high affairs of state.
225
 At the 
same time, there are challenges that are attributed to the combination of powers. 
These are general problems of governance in municipalities.   
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2. Legislation, nevertheless, provides some degree of separation between the executive 
and the council by allocating powers, responsibilities and duties of the executive 
separated from the council. Legislative functions are left within the scope of the 
council, under the control and charge of the speaker, whereas executive functions 
have been entrusted in the executive mayor or executive committee. This manifests an 
intention by the law makers to create a distinction between council and their functions 
on the one hand, and the executive and their functions on the other hand.  
3. There is no express provision in the Constitution or legislation requiring the council to 
oversee the executive. However, legislation hasexpressly entrusted the executive 
mayor the authority to oversee the municipalities‟ provision of services and the 
executive mayor has an obligation to report to the council.
226
 A number of provisions 
in legislation, nevertheless, do provide avenues of oversight by the council over the 
executive and administration and by the executive over the administration. Such 
provisions include those laying down the mechanisms which have been the subject of 
this study and have the potential to enhance oversight and accountability. 
5.2.2 The mechanisms and structures for separation of powers oversight 
1.   There are a number of mechanisms which are provided by legislationwhich are being 
used by the municipalities to provide for separation of powers and enhance oversight. 
They include the terms of reference and the systems of delegation as required by the 
Systems Act,
227
 use of annual reports, use of service delivery and budget 
implementation plan (SDBIP), budget statement, mid-year budget performance 
reviews, performance agreements, use of section 79 committees and oversight 
committees. 
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2. In terms of separating powers and functions, the terms of reference and delegations 
are very significant. These two mechanisms have enabled the municipalities under 
review to design their models of governance in a manner that segregates the executive 
from the council. It is also through the use of these mechanismsthat these 
municipalities have allocated significant oversight powers to section 79 committees. 
The oversight powers and functions, however, differ from municipality to 
municipality. Thus the use of terms of reference is most significant in facilitating the 
separation of powers and function between the executive and the council, but has also 
some significance in enhancing oversight processes. 
3. The other mechanisms listed in 1 above, are mostly useful in ensuring oversight by 
the council over the executive and administration and by the executive over the 
administration. The mechanisms do provide oversight in different stages. Budget 
statement and SDBIP and council processes before their approval provide concurrent 
oversight. Monthly and quarterly reports and the mid-year budget and performance 
assessment reports also ensure oversight in the implementation process and thus 
provide concurrent oversight. Annual reports, which are followed by oversight 
reports, facilitate oversight after the implementation process and thus provide ex post 
oversight. 
5.2.3 Delimitation of powers, oversight and structures 
1. Through the use of terms of reference and systems of delegation the powers and 
functions ofthe council as a legislative body are separated from the powers and 
functions of the executive. However, the separation is a result of both the use of terms 
of reference and delegations as well as from the allocation of powers and functions 
made by legislation.  
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2.  Even though here is a separation of executive powers and functions from the council 
in the municipalities under review, there are limitations in construing such separation 
in the sense of the doctrine of separation of powers. These limitations are that, in the 
first place, there is a significant overlap between the executive functionaries and the 
council as a legislative body. Members of the executive are also part of the council. 
The powers, functions and responsibilities of the executive are mostly delegated from 
the council. This means that the council may review or reverse decisions of the 
executiveor make the decision itself or withdraw the delegation altogether. Secondly, 
the express provision of the Constitution and legislation that all executive and 
legislative powers are vested in the council contradicts the doctrine of separation of 
powers. The reasonable conclusion in the circumstances is that the municipalities 
under review have a much muted separation of the executive and legislative functions 
which does not satisfy the principle of separation of powers.  
3.         The limited separation of powers and functions, as noted in 2 above is still of 
significance. It has the potential of enhancingefficiency and effectiveness, and 
facilitatingoversight and checks and balances in the same way the application of the 
doctrine of separation of powers would do. To access the utility of the limited 
separation, it is suggested that overriding powers of the council to exercise executive 
functions should be cautiously exercised. 
4. There is a lack of capacity to engage by the councillors in the metropolitan 
municipalities reviewed.The councillors in the council meetings and the committees 
do not effectively scrutinise, question and review reports furnished in the council or 
committees. This is attributed to the fact that the councillors do not appreciate the 
contents of the reportsand lack requisite know-how on oversight processes. This 
deficiency renders legislative oversight over the executive inadequate. 
 69 
 
5. Usage of the mechanisms of terms of reference and systems of delegation has enabled 
the municipalities to create enhanced oversight systems and structures. This provides 
a avenues for practical checks and balances between the executive and the council, 
more especially through section 79 committees.  
5.3.  THE BEST PRACTICES IN THE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITIES 
REVIEWED 
There are some commendable practices in the metropolitan municipalities reviewed in 
respect of separation of the powers and functions and enhancing oversight. Those practices 
that can be highlighted as best practices are as below; 
1. The use of section 79 committees as portfolio committees for oversightas observed in 
all three municipalities, instead of the use of section 80 committees. This enables the 
committees to exercise oversight functions efficiently, particularly because section 79 
committees are not ordinarily answerable to the executive. 
2. The allocation of powers and authority of initiating policy and by-laws to the 
executive rather than to the portfolio committees. Such authority is executive in 
nature and ought to be left with the executive if functions are to be separated. 
Allocating such powers to the portfolio committees is likely to compromise the ability 
of the committees to provide concurrent andex post oversight on policy and by-laws 
since they cannot oversee their own work. 
3. The allocation of some executive and administrative functions to the offices of the 
speaker and the chief whip in matters relating to the operation of their offices is a 
good practice. It ensures that these offices are not seen to be dependent on the 
executive or administration and that their management of the council processes and 
party relations are not compromised by dependence on the executive and 
administration.  
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4 The recognition of the executive mayor as the head of the municipality, as is the case 
with the City of Johannesburg, is commendable. This is a good practice as it partly 
resolves the uncertainty in terms of leadership of the municipality between the 
speaker and the executive mayor.  
5 The adoption by the council of a policy on budget implementation and monitoring as 
has been done at Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality is a practice to be emulated.  
6 Requiring the executive mayor to be responsible for the preparation of the annual 
report, as is the case in the City of Cape Town, other than merely requiring the 
executive mayor to table it is also commendable. Allocating that responsibility to the 
executive mayor ensures that he or she is actively involved in the preparation process. 
4  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Having made the assessment and findings as well as outlining the best practices, 
recommendations will be made. The recommendations are made in line with the focus of the 
study on separation of powers and oversight.  The argument that purposeful use of 
mechanisms in legislation may translate into significant separation of powers and enhanced 
oversight guides the direction of the recommendations. The recommendations are outlined 
below. 
1. In terms of the legal framework, it is recommended that the current constitutional 
design, entrusting both executive and legislative authority in the council of a 
municipality be maintained. The focus of the municipalities should rather be on the 
proper and purposeful use of the legislative mechanisms available to segregate the 
executive functions from the council and to improve oversight. 
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2. Municipalities should consider following the comprehensive and combined systems in 
drawing up the terms of reference and systems of delegation.
228
 The terms of 
reference and delegations of a particular office bearer or structure have to be laid 
down in a single document and all the terms of reference and delegation compiled in a 
comprehensive system of delegations. This is recommended as it ensures easy 
accessibility of all terms of reference and delegations.  
3. It is recommended that municipalities adopt systems of governance separating 
functions of the executive from functions of the council. This may loosely be referred 
to as a separation of functions instead of the separation of powers. It is not correct to 
state or attempt to have separation of powers at municipal level within the current 
constitutional and legislative framework. The result would be contradictory to the 
prescription of the Constitution and legislation. What should be encouraged is the 
separate status and functioning of the executive from the council, subject to the 
provisions of the Constitution and legislation. 
4. Further to recommendation number (2) above, when allocating roles and 
responsibilities in the terms of reference or the delegations, municipalities need to 
make sure that  the powers and functions of office bearers and structures should be 
designed in such a way that a significant segregation or separation between functions 
that are executive in nature and functions that are legislative.  
5. It is recommended that the municipalities have to clearly spell out the relationship 
between the speaker and the executive mayor as well as clarify on the overall 
authority of the municipality‟s affairs. 
6. It is recommended that an express provision indicating who has the overall 
responsibility to direct and oversee the administration between the speaker and the 
                                                          
228
 See section 4.2.1 above. 
 72 
 
executive mayor be introduced. This express provision may either be inserted in 
legislation or the municipalities may deal with it in that manner in the terms of 
reference and delegations. This is necessary to clear out the uncertainty that exists due 
to the conflating of powers in the council. It is suggested that the administration be the 
responsibility of the executive mayor because administrative functions are closely 
related to execution and implementation of municipal programs. Further, according to 
legislation the executive mayor has oversight powers over municipal management.
229
 
7. Capacity building measures for councillors in respect of scrutiny and oversight are 
recommended in an effort to deal with the lack of meaningful engagement when 
reports are presented in the council or committees. In relation to the reports envisaged 
by section 71 and 72 of MFMA, guidelines aimed at improving the quality of debate 
and deliberations. 
8. In the case of executive mayoral or collective municipal systems, specific guidelines 
need to be put in place outlining the instances where the council may exercise 
executive functions to ensure that the practice of segregating executive functions from 
the council is maintained. It is recommended that the power of the council to perform 
executive functions should be exercised with caution, although the executive 
powersare vested in the council by the Constitution. This recommendation can be 
applied through legislation. The national government can do that through its authority 
to regulate the exercise of executive functions of municipalities under section 151(3) 
and 155(7) of the Constitution.  
9. Apart from what is recommended in 8 above, it is recommended that the courts 
should also adopt an approach that allows municipal executive to exercise executive 
authority without being eclipsed by the council. The council should be allowed to 
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exercise executive authority itself in specific circumstances.  Only when such 
approach is advanced can a meaningful segregation or separation of powers and 
functions be attained. 
10. It is recommended that section 79 committees should not be allocated responsibility 
of initiating policy or by-laws. Such responsibility should be the domain of the 
executive office bearers and structures. The responsibility to initiate policy or by-laws 
is an executive function and allocating the same to section 79 c0mmittees may 
compromise the ability of the section 79 committees to provide the requisite scrutiny 
and checks on the executive. 
 
It is believed that the implementation of the above recommendations will help national policy 
makers, the provincial government and the municipalities instil municipal systems of 
governance separating the executive functions from legislative functions, withmeaningful 
oversight over the executive. In the long run, better and efficient governance should result. It 
is expected that with such better governance that ensure checks and balances and 
accountability, it will lead to better service delivery by municipalities. 
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